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Today  there  are  three  commonly  used  methods  in  the  management  of  the  integrity  of  a 
process  plant:  Reliability  Centred  Maintenance  (RCM),  Risk  Based  Inspection  (RBI)  and 
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on  NORSOK  Z‐008.  Historically,  RCM  has  come  from  the  civil  aviation  industry.  It  helps  to 
rationalize  design, maintenance  and  inspection  activities  based  on  operational,  economic  and 















purists  may  argue  about  the  finer  distinctions  between  the  three,  it  would  be  interesting  to 
study whether it is possible to combine the three approaches into an integrated approach. The 
integrated approach would endeavour  to optimise  inspection, maintenance and availability of 










This  work  shall  contain  a  detailed  comparative  study  between  RCM,  RBI  and  criticality 






Considering  that  there  are  a  number  of  variations  of  the  same methodology,  this  work  is 
limited to the following: 
 The RCM methodology:  Based  on  the  book Reliability­Centred Maintenance  by  John 
Moubray. 









1. Literature study. 
2. Comparison of the different methodologies. 
3. Report writing. 
The  literature  study  was  conducted  to  enhance  the  understanding  and  knowledge  about 
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM), Risk Based Inspection (RBI) and the NORSOK approach 
to maintenance through the standards Z‐008, Z‐013 and Z‐016. In connection with the literature 
study  dialogues  and  meetings  were  carried  out  with  employees  and  inspection  specialists 













This  thesis  is  built  up  of  four  chapters  with  several  different  sub‐chapters.    The  theory 
behind the different maintenance and inspection strategies that have been considered has been 
presented  in  Chapter  2.    Chapter  3  describes  the  results  and  discussion.  Chapter  4  gives  the 
major conclusions of the work. The references used for the study are presented at the end; most 























Today maintenance  is  an  important  part  of  almost  any  industry  in  the world  and  holds  a 
relatively large share of the operational budget. But maintenance is not a new phenomenon; for 
example, when people  in  former  times were keeping up  their  tools  they were basically doing 











became a  serious  challenge. This  led  to  a demand  for better ways of  ensuring  that  the assets 
would work  as  intended  and,  instead  of  letting  assets  run  to  failure,  preventive maintenance 
was introduced. In the 1960s preventive maintenance consisted of fixed maintenance intervals 
(Moubray,  1997). Not  only did maintenance become a more  vital  part  of most  industries,  the 
maintenance costs also went up. As a result, the plant owner had to begin to manage these costs, 
and maintenance planning and control systems became more common (Moubray, 1997). More 
mechanized  equipment  meant  higher  purchase  prices  for  the  assets.  To  expand  the  profit, 
people began searching for ways to expand the lifetime of the equipment (Moubray, 1997). 
From mid 1970 and forward to today, the need for maintenance has risen further. Industries 
such  as  the  petroleum  industry,  the  nuclear  industry,  the  space  industry  and  the  airplane 
industry,  to mention some, have brought  forward the need  for expansion and development of 
maintenance  in the  last decades. Higher plant availability and reliability, greater safety, better 
production  quality,  no  damage  to  the  environment,  longer  equipment  life  and  greater  cost 
effectiveness  were  needed  (Moubray,  1997).  As  a  product  of  these  demands,  the  costs  of 
maintenance  increase,  and  today  the  cost  of  maintenance  is  one  of  the  largest  expenses 
regarding operational costs.  
Today there may be new challenges that have to be solved. For example, on the Norwegian 














the  Federal  Aviation  Administration  to  get  a  licence. When  the  first  jumbo  jet,  the  747,  was 
developed,  the cost of  the existing preventive maintenance programmes would have been  too 
expensive to operate the jumbo jet in a profitable fashion. On that basis, the commercial aviation 
industry  began  to  re‐evaluate  its  maintenance  strategies  and  the  product  of  this  evaluation 
became the MSG‐1 (maintenance steering group‐1) for the 747. The new strategy made use of 
decision  trees  to  rank  the  different  preventive  maintenance  tasks  along  with  a  plan  for 
preserving  critical  components  during  flight.  By  conducting  the MSG‐1 plan,  the maintenance 
cost went down and the 747 became a reality. During 1975 the programme was adopted by the 




specified period of time under given operating conditions (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2003). 
Reliability centred maintenance: a process used to determine what must be done to ensure that any 
physical asset continues to do what its users wants it to do in its present operating context (Moubray, 





of    articles  and  book  have  been  written  on  the  subject.  RCM  has  become  an  SAE  standard 
(JA1011‐12).  
As  mentioned,  a  lot  has  been  written  on  this  subject.  In  an  attempt  to  be  true  to  one 
























When determining the desired performance level,  it  is  important to take into consideration 
that  the desired performance  level cannot exceed  the performance standard  the equipment  is 
built for. For example, a pump cannot meet a desired performance of 800m³/hour if the pump is 
only  constructed  to  manage  600m³/hour.  Therefore,  when  defining  the  performance  of  the 




































The RCM categorizes failure mode into three groups. The first group concerns failures that cause 
the capacity of the equipment or system to drop below the desirable performance level after the asset 







The  next  group  concerns  failures  that  cause  the  performance  to  rise  above  the  desirable 
performance  level.   When  the  asset  performs  over  the  specified  level,  the  deterioration may 
increase due to the extent of working load.  Higher performance of some equipment could also 
bring the system out of balance. For example, if a pump starts to deliver 800m³/hour instead of 








The  last group comprises  failures  that are caused by assets  that cannot meet  the desirable 
level of performance because of lack of initial capability. This could be, for example, a pump that 
the manufacturer states could manage 800m³/hour and the user sets the desirable performance 
level  to 700m³/hour. But because of  faults,  this  specific  pump has  just  an  initial  capability  of 
500m³/hour.  
The  fourth  question  is  trying  to  state  what  happens  if  a  functional  failure  occurs.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  this  question  does  not  deal  with  the  consequence  of  a  failure.  For 
example, if a pump is delivering less than it should, then the answer could be loss of flow rate. 
Or  perhaps  the  pump  has  a  leak,  and  then  the  answer  to  question  four  would  be  loss  of 
containment.  In  other  words,  a  failure’s  effects  describe  what  happens  when  a  failure mode 
occurs.  
Question  five  will  categorize  the  different  outcome  when  a  functional  failure  occurs.  In  a 






into  three  broad  categories  of  consequences.  Three  of  the  categories  ‐  
safety  and  environmental  consequences,  operating  consequences  and  non‐operating 
consequences ‐ are evident failures.  It  is  important to take into consideration failures that are 















The  first  is  the relationship between the age and the probability of  failure. The second is how 
the failure progresses when it starts to occur.  
The  seventh  question  deals with  cases where  a  proactive  task  cannot  be  found.  A  default 
action  is  chosen  if  a proactive  task  is not beneficial. Default  actions  could be  redesign,  failure 
findings or run to failure.  
2.2.3 Grouping and classification 
To  conduct  the  RCM  methodology  the  way  it  should  be  done,  it  is  important  to  get  a 
systematic overview of all the equipment that is relevant for the analysis. RCM uses hierarchic 
levels to group and classify the equipment, functions and failures at different levels. These levels 


















This  means  that  if  the  probability  of  failure  can  not  be  reduced  sufficiently  by  proactive 
actions, the consequence has to be minimized by redesign or by changing the settings in such a 
way that the failure no longer has a consequence for safety or the environment.  
In  the  RCM  methodology  there  is  an  acceptance  criteria  of  few  or  no  risks  regarding 















classified under  safety  and  environmental  consequences.  Failures  that  can have  an unwanted 
impact  on  the  operations  or  the  productions  would  be  classified  under  operational 
consequences. Consequences  that affect neither safety nor operation are gathered under non‐
operational consequences, this would typically be cost regarding repair.   


























Another  factor  is  what  kind  of  employees  may  be  affected;  for  example,  a  soldier  would 
possibly  have  a  different  view  of  tolerable  risk  in  a  war  zone  than  a  civilian  working  in  an 















































FIGURE 2.2 Deliverables of an RBI assessment to the inspection program (DNV, 2009) 
 
Before the RBI assessment can be carried out, information needs to be collected. The more 

























FIGURE 2.3 RBI generic inspection programme (DNV, 2009).  
After the information is gathered the next step is a screening assessment, where equipment with 
low consequences and low probability of failure is separated from further assessment. Equipment with 
either high or medium consequence or probability of failure is brought forward for a more thorough 
evaluation.  
The task of the detailed assessment is, according to DNV RP-G101, to: “...identify the relevant 
degradation mechanisms, estimate the extent of damage, estimate when inspection should be carried 
out, and propose what inspection technique should be used to ensure acceptable risk levels”  (DNV, 





the  screening  and  the  detailed  assessment.  The  planning  team  work  at  the  inspection  point 
level,  also  taking  into  consideration  other  factors  that  have not been  covered  in  the previous 
work.  These  factors  can  be  logistic,  a  need  for  interaction  with  maintenance  activity  and 
permission for inspection by operations personnel.  












the  plant.  DNV  RP‐G101  mentions  the  separation  and  stabilization  system,  the  open  drain 
system, the closed drain system and flare system among others as examples of systems (DNV, 
2009).  Assessment  at  the  system  level  is,  in  most  cases,  used  to  identify  systems  that  are 
significantly contributing to the risk level for the plant.  

















Inspection  is  carried  out  to  maximize  the  availability  and  profitability  without  having  a 
negative  influence on the safety of humans and the environment. DNV RP‐G 101 recommends 
that  authority  and  corporate/management  targets  for  safety, profit  and availability  should be 
used  as  acceptance  limits  when  planning  the  inspection.  The  risk  acceptance  criteria  can  be 
expressed qualitatively, quantitatively, semi quantitatively or technically.  
When a quantitative approach  is  chosen,  risk acceptance criteria  should be established  for 
each type of risk. These criteria are used to prioritise components for inspections and used as a 
foundation  to  make  sure  that  inspection  is  carried  out  before  risk  breaches  the  acceptance 
criteria.  
Risk  limits  for  personnel  safety  are  often  governed  by  the  authorities.  One  way  for  an 
organization to develop risk acceptance criteria based on the limits given by the authorities, is 
to  first  carry  out  a  risk  analysis  to  determine whether  the  risk  on  the  installation meets  the 













included  in  the  economical  assessment,  then  the  environmental  assessment  is  ruled  by  the 
economical  assessment. DNV RP‐G101  recommends  this  approach  if  a  quantitative method  is 
chosen. If the economical and the environmental risk assessment are kept separate a qualitative 
method is recommended. 
Acceptance  for  economical  risk  can  be  based  on  either  availability  or  on  inspection  costs. 
Acceptance criteria based on availability derives from availability targets that are broken down 
similarly  to  the  method  used  for  safety  acceptance  limits.    The  other  option  is  to  base  the 









The  RBI  methodology  divides  consequence  into  three  main  groups:  safety  consequences, 
environmental consequences and economical consequences. The safety consequences deal with 
injuries  and deaths  due  to  occurrence  of  failure.  Failure modes  that  could  have  an unwanted 
effect on the environment are classified under environmental consequences. Financial loss due 
to downtime, production quality, repair etc. is gathered under economical consequences. 
Since RBI mainly  looks at  the containment  function of a system,  the  failure mode  is  loss of 
containment.  When a leak occurs there can be two scenarios, the leak is ignited or not. In DNV 
RP‐G 101, some factors that are considered when a leak occurs are listed: 
TABLE 2.1 Factors to consider in consequence assessment (DNV, 2009). 
Ignited leak 
Safety Consequence Economic Consequence Environmental Consequence 
Consider loss of life due to: 
 Burns to personnel 
 Direct blast effects to 
personnel 
 Indirect blast effects to 
personnel (missiles, 
falling  objects) 
 Injuries sustained during 
escape and evacuation 
Consider the costs of: 
 Repair of damage to 
equipment and structure 
 Replacement of 
equipment and structural 
items 
 Deferred production 
 Damage to reputation 
Consider the effects of: 
 Toxic gas release 
 Smoke 
Unignited leak 
Safety Consequence Economic Consequence Environmental Consequence 
Consider loss of life due to: 
 Toxic gas release 
 Asphyxiating gas release 
 Impingement of high 
pressure fluids on 
personnel 
Consider the costs of: 
 Deferred production 
 Repairs 
Consider the effects of: 
 Hydrocarbon liquids 
spilled into the sea 
Except for the repair cost, the consequence is not dependent on the equipment that fails.  The 
severity of  the consequence  is determined based on the conditions the  failure creates and the 
circumstances in which the failure occurs. For example,  if the containment function of a pump 
fails,  the  consequence  is  dependent  on  the  volume  released,  whether  the  release  is  toxic  or 






The analysis object  for the RBI  is,  in general, pressurized pipes and vessels, and the failure 
mode is loss of containment caused by degradation of the equipment. The probability of loss of 








degradation  is  not  expected,  components  gets  assigned  a  fixed  probability  of  failure  value  of 
10^‐5. Based on the assumption that there is no degradation mechanism present, the risk value 



















The unknown model deals with components that have inadequate information. In such cases the 
components are assigned a PoF value that equals 1 and further investigation is needed. 
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In  the RBI assessment  the  likelihood of a  failure occurring  is  composed of  four probability 
shares. The first one, PoF technical, expresses the uncertainty around the design loads and load 
bearing  capacities.  These  are  typically  normal  random  variable  and  man‐made  uncertainty 
(DNV, 2009).  
PoF  accidental  uses  historical  data  to  determine  the  probability  of  failure  caused  by 

























is  not  acceptable.  Action  must  be  taken  to  lower  the  consequence,  probability  or  both 
sufficiently that the risk lies within the acceptable region.  












that  the  safety,  value‐adding  and  cost‐effectiveness  for  existing  and  future  activity  is  at  an 
acceptable  level.   This thesis will mainly be focusing at the NORSOK standard Z‐008 since this 
especially concerns maintenance.  
The  NORSOK  Z‐008  is  the  standard  for  the  optimisation  and  preparation  of  maintenance 
programmes  for new and  in‐service  installations offshore and onshore. This standard manage 
the  integrity  of  equipment  and  plant  systems  including  sub‐sea  production  systems,  offshore 
topside systems and oil and gas  terminals.   NORSOK Z‐008 covers equipment  like mechanical 
equipment,  instrumentation  and  electrical  equipment.    The  standard  does  not  concern  load 
bearing structures, floating structure, risers and pipelines. 
The  Z‐008  leans  upon  the  RCM  methodology  for  the  analysis  work;  the  standard 
recommends that when a generic maintenance programme is not established, a more detailed 
RCM analysis should be carried out.   










foundation  for  the  preparation  and  optimisation  of  maintenance  programmes.  Z‐008 
recommends that historical data and experience from both operations and maintenance should 








shall  be  assigned  to  only  one  sub‐function.    Some  may  be  involved  in  more  than  one  sub‐
function;  in  this  case  the equipment  should be assigned  to  the most  critical  sub‐function.   All 






















Z‐008  classifies  consequence  into  three  groups:  HSE  (health,  safety  and  environment), 
production and cost. According to Z‐008, HSE consequences can jeopardize the safety of humans 
and  the  environment.  Consequences  regarding  loss  of  income  caused  by  downtime,  reduced 
production  or  loss  of  production  quality  are  classified  as  production  consequences.  Cost 
consequences are loss of funds excluding production loss. 
Main functions and sub‐systems can contain redundancy. This means that if a failure occurs, 
the consequence will be reduced since  there are other parallel units doing  the same  job. Sub‐
functions  with  redundancy  should  be  identified  and  the  degree  of  redundancy  should  be 
calculated.  Z‐008 classifies main functions and sub‐systems into three levels of redundancy, as 
the figure below is an example of.  
FIGURE 2.8 Classification of redundancy for main function (NORSOK Z-008, 2001) 
2.4.6 Probability of failure 
Probability  of  failure  should  be  based  on  documented  operational  experience  and  failure 
characteristics,  in  other words,  failure  history  and  expert  opinion. When  there  is  an  existing 
generic maintenance programme that  fits,  this should be used. But situations occur where the 
actual equipment has significant differences compared with the equipment that has formed the 
basis  for  the  generic  maintenance  programme.  The  new  equipment  shall  then  be  treated 
separately as a separate generic class. Another factor is that operational conditions can change 
from area to area. When adopting a generic maintenance programme, an assessment should be 
done  to  discover  the  effect  the  operational  conditions,  location  and  external  environmental 
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impacts may have on  the probability of  failure. This  should be done before  the assignment of 
generic maintenance programmes.  
In  cases where  a  generic maintenance  concept  has  not  been  developed,  the  probability  of 
failure  should  be  accessed  through  an  RCM  analysis  by  doing  an  FMECA.  An  FMECA  is  a 























• Insignificant cost 
less than Z NOK. 
(Specify cost limit) 
• No effect on 
production within a 
defined period of time 
 
• No potential for: Injuries, 
fire or effect on safety 
systems. 
1 – Low 
• Moderate cost 




• Brief stop in 
production/ reduced 
rate of production 
lasting less than X 
hours (specify 
duration) within a 
defined period of time 
• Potential for injuries 
requiring medical 
treatment 
• Limited effect on safety 
systems controlling 
hydrocarbons  
2 – Medium 
• Substantial cost 
• exceeding Y NOK 
(specify cost 
limit) 
• Stop in production/ 
significant reduced 
rate of production 
exceeding X hours  
(specify duration) 
within a defined 
• Potential for serious 
personnel injuries 
• May render safety 
systems inoperable 
• Potential for fire in 
classified areas 
3 - High 
C - Cost P- Production availability S- Safety & environment Consequence  




The  NORSOK  Z‐008  does  not  suggest  a  clear  practice  when  it  comes  to  updating  the 
maintenance programme. But  it  recommends  that  the assessment  should be documented and 
made  available  for  updates  and  improvements,  when  more  information  and  facts  from 
operation  become  available.  Z‐008  states  that  at  least  decision  criteria,  definition  of 
consequence  classes,  main  function  description,  sub‐function  description,  assignment  of 

































































In Figure 3.1 a comparison between the three methodologies has been done, in which all three 
methodologies are following the same seven questions of RCM in an assessment of a pipe.  
 
FIGURE 3.1 RCM, RBI, NORSOK Z-008 and RBM assessment of pipe. 
 
Question 1: 
There are some differences; for example, the RCM and the Z-008 are focusing more on how the 
equipment functions in interaction with the system, and therefore the function of a pipe will be described 
as transporting fluid or gas. RBI, on the other hand, is focusing more on the specific task of the pipe itself, 
which is containment.  
Question 2:  
The occurrence of functional failure can also vary slightly. There are two possible events that can 
create functional failure in the RCM and the Z-008 assessment: both obstruction and loss of containment 
can obstruct the transport of gas or fluid. Since RBI only defines the function of a pipe to contain gas or 





What causes functional failure would also not be identical; in addition to corrosion and erosion, the 
RCM and Z-008 also take obstacles into consideration.  
 
Question 4: 
If a failure does happen, RBI only considers possible events that arise caused by leakage; RCM and Z-
008 also take into consideration loss of flow.  
 
Question 5: 
The possible consequence of failure is the same for all three methodologies; the only difference is that 
RCM and Z-008 also evaluate production consequences regarding obstruction of flow. 
 
Question 6: 
RCM and Z-008 use often expressions like mean time to failure (MTTF) to predict failures and RBI 
uses degradation rates. In reality, all three are using failure rates to predict time to next failure. RCM and 
Z-008 use historical data to predict failure rates, RBI uses different parameters to calculate failure rates.  
 
Question 7: 
If a proactive task cannot be found all three methodologies, recommend redesign or corrective 
maintenance based on whether or not the risk is acceptable. RCM and Z-008 can also use failure finding 
tasks by checking hidden functions for whether they have failed or not.  
The examples in this chapter show that in spite of some differences between them, there are also 
several similarities. The author means that an inspection or maintenance method should not be limited 
before the assessment, and all relevant equipment functions, failure modes and so on should be taken into 
consideration before they are ruled out.  
As this chapter has shown, the RBI assessment is not that different from RCM when using the same seven 
questions. This example is hypothetical, but the next chapter focuses on how RBI deals in reality with the 
same key topics as RCM.  
3.2 Identification of 7 Questions in RBI flowchart 
Both risk based inspection and reliability centred maintenance are management decision tools to 
determine when, where, what and how much maintenance or inspection should be done. As mentioned, 
the RCM proceeds by asking seven questions; the answers to these questions give the information that is 
needed in the assessment. But these questions are not really unique to RCM. The figure below shows that 








As Figure 3.2 shows, the RBI assessment makes a decision on almost all the same questions as RCM; 
however, question two is not answered. This question is about the ways in which equipment fails to fulfil 
its functions. And when choosing an RBI assessment, this question is in reality already answered, because 
RBI only concerns loss of containment. 
Based on this, the processes of RCM, NORSOK Z-008 and RBI are built up around the same principle 
and they concern the same topics through the process. The next sub-chapter will look more closely into 
similarity and difference in some key topics and try to give some recommendations on how an integrated 





































































































































































































































































































The purpose of this assignment was to take a starting point in today’s maintenance and inspection 
practice, and see whether or not it was possible to unify them into one integrated tool for maintenance and 
inspection purposes. Today maintenance and inspection are two separate activities, governed by separate 
plans and separate equipment assessment. On the Norwegian coastal shelf there are three methods used to 
govern the integrity of a process plant: Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM), Risk Based Inspection 
(RBI) and criticality analysis for maintenance purposes described in the NORSOK Z-008. 
This thesis has shown that there is great similarity between RBI, RCM and NORSOK Z-008, both in 
configuration of the strategies and in how the result is used to govern further actions. All three 
methodologies group and classify the equipment in a similar manner and they make use of consequence 
and probability of failure to assess the criticality or the risk of the equipment. And RBI does in fact answer 
the same questions that RCM assessment is built up around. There are also some differences, for example 
the estimation of probability of failure. However, it is not necessary to treat all equipment types alike 
during all stages of an assessment before it can be called an integrated approach; the important thing is 
that the results can be used together. 
So, in light of this thesis, it is likely that we can assume that a unified approach towards today’s 
maintenance and inspection strategies is feasible without losing important aspects of any of the strategies. 
But work has to be done on this subject before a unified approach can be achieved.  
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